Risk and security: diagnosis of the present in the context of (post-)modern insecurities by Kaufmann, Stefan & Wichum, Ricky
www.ssoar.info
Risk and security: diagnosis of the present in the
context of (post-)modern insecurities
Kaufmann, Stefan; Wichum, Ricky
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kaufmann, S., & Wichum, R. (2016). Risk and security: diagnosis of the present in the context of (post-)modern
insecurities. Historical Social Research, 41(1), 48-69. https://doi.org/10.12759/hsr.41.2016.1.48-69
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46469-4
Historical Social Research 41 (2016) 1, 48-69 │© GESIS 
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.41.2016.1.48-69 
Risk and Security: Diagnosis of the Present in the 
Context of (Post-)Modern Insecurities 
Stefan Kaufmann & Ricky Wichum ∗ 
Abstract: »Risiko und Sicherheit: Soziologische Zeitdiagnostik im Zeichen 
(post-)moderner Unsicherheiten«. This essay claims that the upsurge of security 
nowadays is not caused by specific events such as 9/11, Fukushima, or similar 
catastrophes. Our assumption is, in contrast, that it is the constitution of func-
tionally differentiated societies itself which allows the security and risk dis-
course to be applied to all types of issues and phenomena, even though security 
and risk have only went viral as universal societal problems in the late 20th cen-
tury. We will flesh out this approach using three bodies of work essential to the 
German debate. With regard to social policy, Franz-Xaver Kaufmann argues that 
the viral nature of the security issue arises from the fact that the security concept 
in modern society is split into system security and self-confidence. Niklas Luh-
mann’s concept of risk – stemming from systems theory – shows that the promi-
nence of the topic is the result of the intrinsically modern compulsion of having 
to forejudge an uncertain future. In contrast, Ulrich Beck’s work on (global) risk 
societies is centred on the catastrophic potential inherent in (post-)modern risks 
as a cause for the rise of security debates. The sociological analysis employed here 
not only explains the rise of risk and security topics; it also provides society 
with a characterization of itself, which in turn can re-affect society and ulti-
mately motivate a different historiographical self-description. 
Keywords: Security, risk, sociological theory, knowledge, governance through 
security. 
1.  Introduction 
The 19th and 20th centuries were obsessed with the problem of accidents 
(work or car); we are now rediscovering the existence of disaster, but with 
the difference that disasters are no longer, as before, attributed to God and 
His providence, but to human responsibility (Ewald 1999, 59).  
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The rediscovery of disaster, which François Ewald observed around the end of 
the 20th century, marks a radical change in the emotional balance of society. 
Where the idea of progress once ruled – fed by the belief that scientific and tech-
nological capabilities will steadily increase – the mere idea of the future now 
loomed darkly. Under the weight of many perceived bad omens, the search for 
security is becoming viral. The practice and the logic of security production are 
changing: Security is becoming the key concept to an excess of new social 
spheres of activity. New principles that claim to guarantee security are put 
forward; new forms of governance are created. There is a downright inflation 
of fields and topics that elevate security to a political issue. Social security, for 
example, is alongside the classic military and interior security, a long estab-
lished field of security in modern societies. Nature conservation has become 
climate security; reactor safety has been expanded to infrastructure security. 
The public discourse includes issues such as energy security, food security, 
medical security, IT security, financial security, and many more. The once 
diagnosed “securitization” of life is no longer confined to the narrow domain of 
national security and public administration; it now spans so many areas of life 
that the idea of a “security society” (Sicherheitsgesellschaft) has been intro-
duced (Singelnstein and Stolle 2006; Groenemeyer 2010).  
At the same time, to ensure security, the various strategies, techniques, and 
tactics are being further differentiated and new principles are beginning to 
emerge. François Ewald recognizes the precautionary principle as a central regu-
latory method in the context of technological, medical, and environmental risks. 
After 9/11, there was tremendous demand for new tactics and strategies incorpo-
rating the principle of pre-emption and the resilience approach to prevent cata-
strophic events or minimize their consequences. As evinced by changing forms of 
governance, security is no longer only a matter of the state. The expansion of the 
security concept implies that the involved protagonists – meaning those who are 
responsible for security management, who feel responsible, or are being made 
responsible – must be identified. This concerns not only state or public agencies 
and organizations, but also: infrastructural operators such as railway companies, 
electricity companies, water supply companies; persons or companies in charge 
of major events, private security firms, religious communities, and even the indi-
vidual citizen. All of these are required to ensure security. Accordingly, the num-
ber of people who are actively and vocally entering the security discourse has 
multiplied. Security is now a theme that has permeated civil society. 
Beyond any contemporary catastrophic events and scenarios – whether it is 
Fukushima, Ebola, Charlie Hebdo or the Lehman Brothers – the viral nature of 
security issues converges in the notion of the general vulnerability of modern 
societies, which in turn leads to general questions about the constitution of 
modern, Western societies and their ways of handling risks, dangers, and 
threats. Risk and security were already been recognized as sociological and 
societal problems in the 1970s and 1980s. We seek to elaborate this argument 
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by discussing three sociological approaches: Franz-Xaver Kaufmann’s exami-
nation of welfare policy; Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory approach to the rise 
of risk; and Ulrich Beck’s works on the (global) risk society. We claim that the 
prominence of risk and security topics nowadays is not so much rooted in spe-
cific problems or events, as it is based in specific structural conditions of func-
tionally differentiated societies. Contemporary societies, in other words, are 
highly complex, tightly interconnected and for this reason vulnerable social 
forms. Kaufmann traces this to the tension between system security and self-
confidence, Luhmann to the increasing modern constraint of having to make 
decisions in the face of an uncertain future, and Beck to the potentially cata-
strophic reflexivity of modernity. This sociological analysis not only serves to 
explain the rise in risk and security topics, but it also provides society with a 
challenging characterization of itself which can in turn re-affect society. 
In our reconstruction of this self-description we focus on three aspects. 
Firstly, we examine the diagnosis of the present. For this purpose we trace the 
relationship between the specific reference points and problems in the life-
world, on the one hand, and the theoretical concepts, on the other hand. In an 
epistemic context, second, we contemplate the possibilities of experiencing 
versus not experiencing modern risks, as well as knowing versus not knowing, 
and the role these elements take. Thirdly, we consider the political element 
which comes with these diagnoses, and how conditions, possibilities and limits 
of planning and controlling are being discussed. The concluding chapter will 
sum up the findings and contrast them with our initial thoughts. 
2.  Franz-Xaver Kaufmann: Security as a Sociological 
Problem 
2.1  Sociological Diagnosis and Theoretical Perspective  
At the end of the 1960s, Kaufmann observed the upsurge of insecurity. Eco-
nomic insecurity, orientational insecurity, as well as individual insecurity had 
become prominent topics which as a whole revealed a deficit. Kaufmann states 
that the flip side of that deficit is the appreciation of the term security (Kauf-
mann 2013 [1973], 14-24). When the talk is of economic insecurity, he further 
elaborates, it does not mean any acute economic plight. Instead, it refers to the 
possibility of future poverty and hardship (ibid., 15). The concern is not for the 
present situation but the potential future. Here, Kaufmann encounters one of 
many security paradoxes: People who are better off economically and whose 
situation is actually improving demand more security. Even more perplexing, 
the issue of social politics and security only emerged once a certain level of life 
security had been reached. Kaufmann points out another paradox: It seems 
completely plausible to us that the human need for security has universal va-
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lidity, even though this perceived characterizing feature of human nature only 
began to stand out in the 20th century (ibid., 10-4). We could say that, with the 
elucidation of these two paradoxes, the sociology of security, as put forward by 
Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, unfolds. It highlights the problems of the social securi-
ty system and its related technologies, arising from the want to control risks 
with insurance and calculations, and works out the underlying societal factors. 
Rather than looking at the responsibilities, causes, and causation of risks and 
threats, a sociology of security focuses on the structural and normative condi-
tions which instilled a need for security, along with the need for methods to 
calculate a sociology of security in modern societies.  
The turn towards security cannot be understood as an answer to a commonly 
felt insecurity caused by a rise of new threats. Instead, the pursuit of, and need 
for, security must simply be accepted as a fact of our present times, and the 
goal of sociological reflection is to explain this fact and to determine its socio-
political meaning (ibid., 16). This leads Kaufmann to differentiate his approach 
from anthropological definitions of a human need for security.  
The theoretical field in which Kaufmann’s sociological approach to security 
unfolds is Arnold Gehlen’s philosophical anthropology, particularly his theory 
of institutions. For Gehlen, institutions vouch for security. At present, however, 
they are in a state of collapse. In his book Urmensch und Spätkultur (2004 
[1956]), he deemed (life) security in the context of institutional theory to be a 
basic concept of his anthropology (see Eßbach 2007; Fischer 2008, 152-76, 
292-9). The fundamental idea is that institutions – be they family, church, 
property, law, or the state – allow the “being which is exempt from instinct, but 
excessively motivated, liberated from nature, and cosmopolitan” to stabilize its 
life (Gehlen 2004 [1956], 46). Institutions transfer basic human needs in rela-
tion to nature, to the social environment, and to oneself, into a state of “back-
ground fulfilment.” The fulfilment of any need is institutionally guaranteed at 
any time, which at the same time changes the need significantly by “pushing it 
back from the foreground of affectivity, […] where in borderline cases, the 
original need does not even require immediate and timely action” (ibid., 55).1 It 
is not necessary to struggle with faith; committing to a church community is 
taken for granted. It is, however, crucial that institutions vividly demonstrate 
their permanence and the thereby guaranteed fulfilment of the primordial need 
to the individual. The mere existence of family, property, and church has a 
calming, reassuring effect. As an anthropological term, security thus signifies 
the institutionally provided relief from having to worry about the imperative of 
urgent and instant need fulfilment. Security constitutes the fundamental re-
quirement for humans to not only be natural beings, but cultural beings. Institu-
tions provide security because of their self-perpetuating, obligatory character, 
                                                             
1  All quotes from Gehlen and Kaufmann are translated by the authors. 
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which appears irreducible. Institutions create stable behavioral guides; they 
regulate emotions, thoughts, and moral attitudes.  
In the modern industrial age, Gehlen observes a dual development. Life se-
curity has tremendously increased due to mechanized environments and the 
emergence of highly differentiated, functional organizations. At the same time, 
functional organizations are losing their institutional character. As organizations, 
institutions are taking on a goal-oriented character and losing their intrinsic value. 
As a result, the stability of the inner worlds is no longer guaranteed and they 
collapse. Using the formula that “the place of institutions is taken by organiza-
tions” Gehlen highlights the loss of relief from having to secure primordial need 
fulfilment, and the general tendency towards permanent reflection and rational, 
goal-oriented decision-making (Gehlen 1980, 162). With the collapse of institu-
tions, stability can only be created subjectively and originate in the individual.  
While Kaufmann’s sociology of security follows the basic concept of Geh-
len’s anthropology, it does not interpret our present times as the end of institu-
tions, but rather perceives social security systems as a contemporary form of 
institution, congruent with the state of society:  
Modern systems of collective life care seek to guarantee virtually constant 
human need fulfilment, insofar as it is purchasable, by providing amounts of 
money in, for example, the form of pensions and benefits, for those who can-
not obtain the necessary purchase power through other, standardized means, 
such as work or assets (Kaufmann 2013 [1973], 280).  
Kaufmann breaks with the anthropological security concept when other types 
of security – which cannot be characterized by immediate need fulfilment in a 
material, spiritual, social, communicative, introspective way – are introduced. 
The anthropological security concept does not satisfy a theory which includes 
the types of relief provided by a welfare state, and by economically-operating 
risk technologies.  
From a sociological standpoint, the security problem has shifted. In modern 
society, the need for security can no longer be characterized in the sense of “a 
still insufficient fulfilment of the original need,” but rather as a “consecutive need 
resulting from the institutionalized saturation of that original need” (ibid., 255). 
The institution of social security offers new ways to ensure systemic relief 
through instrumental goal-setting, thereby providing “available courses of action 
and a level of technologically mediated reliability, which were completely un-
known to previous cultures” (ibid., 217). Yet its incidental consequences also 
create a problem in regard to their meaning, which marks the difference be-
tween social security and the former (anthropological) type of security.  
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2.2  Insecurity as Losing the Experience of Geborgenheit2  
Owing to their bureaucratic structures, the generality of their procedures and 
media, their abstractness and their impersonal nature, organizations of social 
security3 impede the subject’s identification with these external guarantors of 
security. Generally speaking, an anthropologically understood life security, 
which results from the immediate unambiguity of the institution and from the 
guarantee of external stability, which is in turn accompanied by an internal 
security, is absent from modern technical systems and organizations. More 
specifically stated, life security can only be experienced in the form of the lost, 
or in the form of loss.4 Precisely therein lies the value that the anthropological 
security term has for sociology: This feeling of loss alludes to a bygone self-
conception of humanity in which one’s own actions are perceived as the en-
forcement of an unquestioned order, in which the possible is limited by an also 
unquestioned horizon, and in which the world in general is understood to be a 
perception independent of the subject. At the core of the anthropological con-
cept lies a meaning of security which is still sought by modern societies: the 
unchallenged unity of “external” and “internal” security. Kaufmann describes 
this state as safety (Geborgenheit): “Safe (geborgen) are those who know they 
are protected and who can feel inside themselves a soothing feeling of reassur-
ance because of it” (ibid., 145).  
Kaufmann outlines three levels on which the modern concept of security de-
veloped during various modernization movements. The first level is the for-
mation of a modern world view, which brought with it a change towards an 
open timeframe and a move towards secularization. In the modern understand-
ing of time, the future is no longer a continuation of the present, but rather 
something that is “inherently uncertain, unavailable and, therefore, insecure” 
(ibid., 159). In other words, contingency is now a firm part of social life, and 
with it comes a general sense of insecurity. At the same time, secularization 
widens the theoretical horizon to include secular world interpretations, such as 
scientific world views, natural law-based views, political-utopic models, etc. 
What all these philosophies have in common is that they do not attach values to 
specific guarantors of order, namely, objectives such as “family, property, 
church” (ibid., 220), but rather to abstract ideas. Values like freedom, equality, 
                                                             
2  There is no exact equivalent term to the German “Geborgenheit,” which combines the 
meaning of feeling at home, safe and warm.  
3  Here, Kaufmann does not want to establish a history of social security as, for example, 
François Ewald (1993) does. He aims to find an ideal determination of a historic difference. 
He tries to accomplish this by analysing historical semantics, mainly the occurrence of the 
term “social security” in the U.S. (in the 1930s), England, France, and Germany (in the 1960s) 
(Kaufmann, 91-139). 
4  To clarify this point: we do not speak of a lower or higher level of security that can be 
empirically determined, but rather about the fact that the ways of seeking security, thinking 
about it and guaranteeing it, have changed radically.  
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and justice become more important in this context. In that sense, the generally 
felt insecurity regarding the future can be lessened as long as it is possible to 
view it in terms of progress: “As long as progress is certain, the idea of pro-
gress itself can actually grow into a stabilizer of expectations – meaning securi-
ty – suitable as a religion” (ibid., 164).  
This mentioned de-objectification of values correlates with the spread of the 
monetary economy. Money devalues the objective world and decreases the 
certainty of life-concerns. Precisely this forms the basis for insurances: To be 
protected and preserved are not objects, but the monetary values representing 
them (see Zwierlein 2016, forthcoming). Security now becomes an issue when-
ever the certainty of progress diminishes. Kaufmann singles out such a moment 
with the emergence of the term “social security.” As was later evident in the 
context of ecological threats, security also became an issue where a de-
objectification was no longer accepted.  
The second level of modernization is the transition to a functional differenti-
ation. With this, the “chains of action,” as Kaufmann puts it in reference to 
Norbert Elias, become longer. We may also say that a benefit system is created, 
which is much more inscrutable to the individual.5 Due to the efficiency of 
modern circulation systems, a new type of security develops: system security. 
This includes the aspect of safety in the technical and industrial sense, as well 
as the aspect of security, for example, legal security. However, system security 
remains non-transparent and abstract to the individual, and never provides 
“overall stability of life-concerns (Lebensbezüge)” (ibid., 218), nor does it 
bring about emotional or inner security. For the individual, system security can 
only be attained through trust. Yet this trust cannot be tied to familiarity or to 
personal expectations of behavior. “Only the non-distrust, the distant, calculat-
ed trust – roughly in the sense of Luhmann’s ‘system trust’ – is appropriate for 
the complexity of the situation” (ibid., 207). Trust in this sense means counting 
on the systems to work.  
The third level of modernization is the individual level, where security be-
comes a task: “The formation of identity becomes a subject-related problem” 
(ibid., 223). Personal security can no longer be provided by external systems in 
which the individual only partially participates. While emotional stability may 
be sought in intimate relationships, in the end individuals are on their own. An 
uncertain future can only be handled within the subject, which creates a prob-
lematic identity of self: “Identity then is the problem of one’s own permanence, 
the problem of how to be the same in the future as I am and as I was” (ibid., 
223). The issue of “self-confidence” is involved in dealing with this problem.  
                                                             
5  Nowadays, expert systems are being established, which are tasked solely with the review of 
such chains of action – for example, the labelling of organic foods or the labelling of finan-
cial products – but then fail to actually do this.  
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Kaufmann’s definition of modern security leads him to further differentiat-
ing into three concepts: safety (Geborgenheit), system security, and self-
confidence. He also identifies two central characteristics of security: its vague-
ness and its development as a value concept. In reconstructing its common 
linguistic usage, along with the history of the term “security” in the jargon used 
in different functional areas, Kaufmann points out the vagueness of the modern 
security term. In its usage, a process is in place where layers are being stripped 
from its meaning. In this process, a meaning was abstracted from a state of 
“being secure,” which was defined in relation to goods and threats (ibid., 153-
6). The most general sense of the word which remains is that of safety, of being 
without danger. Danger is understood as the possibility of an event occurring 
which would be considered negative. That future occurrence is seen as neither 
certain nor impossible (ibid., 152). This definition alludes to the rationality of 
the risk concept, and refers to a “guarantee for the future per se in regard to any 
and all possibilities” (ibid., 156). The structural basis of what has been diag-
nosed as a “securitization” of countless areas of life is revealed by this (see 
Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998).  
Secondly, the semantics of security include a normative guiding principle, 
which developed over the course of the historic process that shaped the institu-
tionalization of social security in politics, law, and technology, and which gave 
meaning to these trends (ibid., 49-139). However, it also always transcends the 
function of a specific institution, as well as the objects and terms which sym-
bolize it and make it explicit. The concept of security carries with it a quality of 
emotional appeal, which often legitimizes needs that cannot actually be ful-
filled by an institution. In his analysis of historic semantics, Kaufmann recon-
structs those needs that positively underscore the unity of a value concept: 
“Security as a value concept means safety, reliability, certainty, and a freedom 
from concerns; or: the subjective ‘feeling of security’ is supposed to be legiti-
mate in the sense that objectively, there is no threat.” (ibid., 149) Despite the 
vagueness of the term, it is not an empty formula without any content. As a 
value concept which is both abstract as well as emotionally charged, security 
contains “relevant ideas about what should be” (ibid., 39) in a society, ideas 
which are exempt from any discussion and which allow for agreements, despite 
divergent interests. In the form of such a societal value concept, security can 
determine the direction of actions. However, since its abundant possibilities 
cannot be exhausted with individual actions, it also exceeds any specific pur-
pose for action. It is the socio-political punch line of the sociology of security 
that, accordingly, security can never be a (purposeful) political goal (ibid., 39). 
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2.3  Limits of Calculability, Constitutive Paradoxes of Modern 
Security  
A sociology of security marks the limits of calculability and control in the 
social state. One integral element is the level of functional differentiation in 
society, which has no center of control. Kaufmann agrees with Niklas Luh-
mann on this point. Even more relevant to our argument, Kaufmann examines 
basic themes, ambiguities, and paradoxes related to the modern pursuit of secu-
rity, all of which appear in later debates. Simply put, security is an effect of 
contingency and even of freedom. More precisely, it stems from the freedom 
gained from safety (Geborgenheit), resulting in a paradox: security is pursued 
in the form of safety (Geborgenheit), meaning a coherent unity of external and 
internal security, which is no longer attainable within the structures of our 
modern times. As a result, security – split into system security and self-
confidence – has firmly settled as a structural problem of modern societies, and 
it can be applied to, and expanded in, virtually any context. Kaufmann’s soci-
ology of security in the 1970s thus firstly highlights essential concepts and 
theoretical links that are brought up in current debates. In this sense, Kaufmann 
indicates the starting point of ecological criticism as well as the difference 
between objective and subjective risk. 
At the core of Kaufmannn’s definition is, of course, the connection between 
security and social politics. He does not share the pessimism of Gehlen’s cul-
tural criticism. Even though system security cannot provide the feeling of safe-
ty (Geborgenheit) the way pre-modern institutions did, and the modern subject 
can achieve stable security only by its own actions, Kaufmann ascribes to it the 
ability to “coordinate the areas of interests and activities, human contacts and 
economic safeguarding in such a way that a significant amount of orientational 
security and, thereby, possible courses of action, are retained” (ibid., 261). 
Precisely this provides the challenge a welfare policy has to address.  
3.  Niklas Luhmann: On the Sociology of Risk  
3.1  Sociological Diagnosis and Theoretical Perspective  
Niklas Luhmann wrote his Sociology of Risk in a moment in history when 
modern society is confronted by the consequences of its evolution and imagi-
nes its own death as a future expectation. No later than the 1970s, with the 
growth of ecological problems and the related debates, did the possibility that 
humans “will decimate or eradicate itself through human-made catastrophe” 
(Luhmann 1998, 75) become a commonplace fear. However, this fear no longer 
remained limited to society’s imagination (see Horn 2014) but principally 
reached the level of theory. This theory sets in at the end:  
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In thinking about destruction, it makes no sense to think of people and society 
separately. The destruction of communication can lead to the death of many. 
We need only consider the breakdown of the transportation system, the money 
economy, or medical care. The extinction of all human life means: the end of 
transmissions, the end of all communication, the end of society. Given this 
perspective, it becomes impossible to separate organic, psychic and social sys-
tems (Luhmann 1998, 83). 
Sociological system theory decodes this situation as a structural crisis of a 
society which “can no longer exist within the structural and semantic status 
quo” (ibid), and thus highlights the urgent need of a sociological reformulation 
of risk.  
Such a reformulation is defined in contrast to rationalistic decision theory 
and the mainstream of risk sociology. Luhmann begins with the standard ra-
tionalistic formulation of risk, which states that “possible damage is accepted for 
the sake of an advantage” (Luhmann 1990, 139). The rationalistic approach on 
risk implies that a damage is avoidable if a different decision is made. The ration-
alistic formulation also suggests the employment of risk decision-making in 
situations which allow for rational calculation, that is, when risk can be deter-
mined as a quantifiable factor in the expert formula: risk = probability of occur-
rence x degree of damage. Luhmann rejects this formulation of risk (see ibid, 
138-149). In fact, it is not possible in modern societies to make a decision for 
security. Therefore, according to Luhmann’s definition, security and risk cannot 
be counter terms. Luhmann’s criticism is, for the most part, mirrored in a version 
of risk sociology, which contrasts the above expert calculation with a risk concept 
based on a “social rationality” (Perrow 1984, 315 et seq., 321-4). In it, risk is 
determined by other, non-quantifiable factors, such as intangible threats. It also 
alludes to a general insecurity, and raises the question of the (ir-)reversibility of 
damages done, for example, by large-scale technologies (see Beck 1992, 1995; 
Evers and Nowotny 1987; Wildavsky 1988). This effective distinction between 
expert calculation and social rationality in the treatment of risks parallels 
Kaufmann’s differentiation of system security and self-confidence in another 
way. For example, in criminology, this distinction is translated into “objective 
security situation” versus “subjective perception of security” or “subjective 
feeling of security” (Albrecht 2011). While all these formulations observe risk 
from the perspective of different social participants and establish it as a fact, 
Luhmann’s concept argues from the perspective of a second-level observer, 
and suggests a distinction between risk and threat. This distinction  
works with attributions. Depending on the attribution, something appears as a 
risk or as a threat. One can then reconstruct that first-level observers (which 
always include those who make decisions and those who act) presume that 
there are risks or threats, and that it is possible to interpret these phenomena 
independent of the observer (with the consent of all observers) (Luhmann 
1990, 149).  
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The sorting effort is made by “attributions or non-attributions to decisions” 
(ibid.). Thus risk and threat in Luhmann’s concept may be preliminarily de-
fined as follows: Risk classifies future development and possible damage as the 
consequence of a decision, while threat is used when this development or the 
possible damage may occur independent of previous decisions.  
3.2  Not-Knowing as the Foundation of Risk Sociology  
Epistemologically, Luhmann follows the complexity-theory system concepts of 
the natural sciences. Out of this body of thought, he not only employs the con-
cept of autopoiesis, but also other mental figures such as not-knowing or un-
knowingness (Luhmann 1989, 11-4). A certain form of not-knowing applies in 
any fora in which future is discussed. While the tools and concepts employed in 
futurology and any form of communication about the future, including probabilis-
tics, prognoses, scenarios, etc., certainly create knowledge, Luhmann points out 
that they always involve some form of not-knowing or non-knowledge. Every 
prediction about the future serves to remind us that something is not known in 
some specific way. Moreover, with the turn towards complexity-theory think-
ing, completely new ways of not-knowing emerge not just in a formal sense, 
but also in the objective dimension. Using the example of ecology: “What 
causes concerns today and what defines a catastrophe in the ecological sense 
are rapid or slow changes that take place in huge or very small spatial and 
temporal dimensions, typically in both large and small at the same time” 
(Luhmann 1998, 85).6  
This shift in the relationship between knowing and not-knowing has dra-
matic consequences for society and the way it communicates. Changes fraught 
with uncertainty  
overwhelm both the ability of the individual, bound to things and causality, to 
imagine such a reality, and society’s communicative (linguistic) practice. 
These changes can no longer be presented as manageable and relevant 
knowledge, despite the calculations, half-lives, and so forth (ibid, 35). 
Thus, in contrast to Kaufmann’s sociology of security, Luhmann’s sociology of 
risk radicalizes its central question: The problem is not reaching a social con-
sensus about system security or the stabilization of the individual, but whether 
or not a society which cannot know anything certain about its future, which can 
at most speak of the probable and the improbable, can even reach a social con-
                                                             
6  One may argue that even when linear causality-based thinking was employed, we did not 
know that – nor how – small-scale shifts in an ecosystem can manifest effects on a higher 
level, and that this can even lead to the collapse of entire systems. However, the distinction 
is being able to consider and formulate such a not-knowing with the help of complexity 
theory-based thinking.  
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sensus (or at least a preliminary communicative understanding) (Luhmann 
1993, ix). 
From the perspective of a second-level observer risk is a tension between 
temporal and social dimensions. Risk is not a socially neutral reality independ-
ent of the observer, but rather a type of time-binding structural formation in 
modern society, which fundamentally operates on the level of uncertainty about 
the future. Two dimensions of contingency, which provoke certain social con-
ditions, are associated with risk: The occurrence of the future event and the 
damaging consequences of the event are neither necessary nor impossible 
(ibid., 16 et seq.). In these ways, risk differs from the long-tested contingency 
cultures of law and the economy. Law limits the scope of future possibilities 
with rules which stabilize the expectations of future behavior. Norms apply 
whether or not they are being complied with or broken, particularly in constitu-
tional states. The economy stabilizes future expectations with shortage. Proper-
ty is the central mechanism to create shortage. Property means that someone 
has reserved goods, which others also want to access for their own future, 
which creates the shortage that drives the economy (Luhmann 1990, 136). 
Neither type of future commitment can be applied effectively to contemporary 
risk issues, especially in regard to ecology: Liability only applies when obvious 
causalities are present, and economically, the calculation of subsequent costs, 
particularly of many controversial technological innovations, is not possible. 
Risk represents under these circumstances another form of future commitment 
besides rules and shortages. In Luhmann’s concept of risk, future expectations 
are tied by the difference of probability and improbability. However, there is no 
instance of social regulation as is present in law and economy: “What remains 
are only differences, distinctions, forms permitting us to articulate it” (Luh-
mann 1993, 70). Thus, risk infinitely expands the possible range of present 
decisions, “since we know very well that no one already lives in the future, and 
that no one can therefore know any better” (ibid, 72).   
3.3  Aporias of Regulation  
Luhmann differentiates between risk and threat at the point where the distinc-
tion between risk calculation and risk perception is usually made. Attributions of 
risk or threat therefore not only refer to the difference between decision and non-
decision. Moreover, the question is  
who or how can possible damages be attributed. When attributed to oneself, 
we speak of risk. When attributed to someone or something else, we speak of 
threats. [...] These may be natural disasters or decisions made by other per-
sons, groups, or organisations (Luhmann 1990, 160 et seq.).  
Thus, risk has an explosive nature in a social context. In modern societies, the 
risks for the individual can become threats for others. The resulting conflicts 
seem barely resolvable.  
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Luhmann’s complex lines of argumentation concerning the dynamics of this 
development contain four elements. The first element refers to the changing 
assessment of risk over time. Decisions can only be made in the present, and 
every decision – even the decision not to decide anything – may be a risk in 
itself. “With hindsight, we evaluate risk in terms of on whether a loss has oc-
curred or not” (Luhmann 1993, 42). Since Chernobyl and Fukushima, the risks 
of the nuclear industry have been evaluated differently. Since 9/11, terror risks 
have been judged in other ways. Since the global financial crisis, the risk of 
speculation has been treated differently. For epistemological reasons, risk as-
sessment has no objective standpoint. 
Nonetheless, the second element is the fact that there are continually more 
situations in which decisions are being made with regard to the future. More 
things appear to be consequences of a decision. Future and decision-making 
enter a circular relationship. The future only seems accessible when decisions 
are made, and can always be explained by previously made decisions. The 
thinning of the ozone layer, for example, appears to be a consequence of the 
decision to use CFC as a refrigerant, propellant and dissolvent, even though no 
one imagined these consequences when CFC was introduced. The problem of 
decision-making is only exacerbated by the fact that decisions are inherently 
risky, even when they are risk-averse. For instance, additional security systems 
in large-scale technologies increase the complexity of these facilities or ma-
chines. This may cause more interference, which does not decrease but increase 
control issues. When a technology is governed by controlled causal processes, 
a permanent issue exists to prevent uncontrolled processes. The correct func-
tioning of technology maintains and explains the risk (ibid., 90 et seq.; see also 
Perrow 1984). Giving up such technologies, however, can increase risks on 
other levels, such as that posed to welfare.  
The third element is the conflict potential of decisions. This potential results 
from the fact that “the willingness to accept a threatening future” is heavily 
dependent on “whether or not the problem is viewed as a threat or a risk” 
(Luhmann 1990, 144 et seq.). Both viewpoints become even more irreconcilable 
when reflected upon reflexively: if the ego knows that a threat for itself is ‘only’ a 
risk for the alter ego. Luhmann speaks about a build-up of threats and risk by a 
“re-entry” of difference into communication. With “the spectacular upsurge of 
ecological risk in technological development” (Luhmann 1993, 71) the difference 
between risk and threat enters the social perception of risk. In an ecological 
context, attributing risks to decisions can, in most cases, only be done without 
any guarantee for rational decidability and without regard to the rationality of 
risk calculations (ibid., 119). Ecological problems, in particular, are a poignant 
example of how one person’s risk is another person’s threat. That is why the 
risk problem completely overlays the classic threat problem (ibid., 107 et seq.).  
The fourth element is the difficulty to place attributions in the context of 
ecological crisis:   
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A given threshold being passed, an irreversible shift in ecological balance or 
the occurrence of a disaster is often not attributable to any particular individu-
al decision. […] In other words, in the accumulation of the effects of decision 
making, in long-term consequences of decision no longer traceable casual re-
lations, there are conditions that can actuate considerable losses or damage 
without decision having been made such detrimental effects would never have 
occurred (ibid, 26).   
The possibility to attribute to risks or threats collapses. Differentiating between 
risks and threats previously had the effect that there were ways to ensure order 
by using legal liability and economic reparation as compensation for damages. 
This no longer works under the circumstances explicated above (ibid, 119 et 
seq.). It is unclear who is even affected by consequences of decisions, because 
these possible effects are not limited to those who decided for or against the 
implementation of a certain measure. The effects of risks become universal, 
even when the immediate experience of risks decreases. This experience some-
times has to be replaced by abstract ideas about possible repercussions of risks, 
molded by mass media. The result may be twofold:  
The elimination of opportunities for experience encourages the development 
of socially inflammable fears that cannot be countered. Or vice versa, it gives 
rise to a reassurance fostered by the circumstances that ‘so far nothing has ev-
er happened’ (ibid, 110). 
The communication of risks either heats up, receives too much of a response 
that cannot be transferred into law, education, or economy, and ultimately 
results in a loss of trust in the appropriate systems; or there is no response and 
the debate remains a background noise which disappears without any effect.  
Risk becomes a way of stabilizing the uncertainty of the future by distin-
guishing the likelihood and the unlikelihood of damages as a result of present 
decisions. Luhmann sees a problem in the fact that these decisions are difficult 
to organize. That problem cannot be resolved by standard calculations or by a 
unifying ethos, for example, environmental ethics. Security is no more an op-
tion than the liberal notion of “everyone carries their own risks.” A single insti-
tution that can make decisions on risks does not exist. Functionally differentiat-
ed societies do not have a center of control; thus, demands to the contrary only 
serve to overburden politics. Concerning the ecological crisis, which runs per-
pendicular to societal subsystems, Luhmann stated the following: This crisis 
cannot be blamed on political and economic misconduct or an insufficient 
ethical sense of responsibility, and it cannot be solved by appropriate political 
provisions, legal restrictions, or a further development of ethical standards. 
Instead, “[t]he problem for me lies much deeper in the differentiation of the 
function systems themselves” (Luhmann 1989, xviii). 
Luhmann’s Sociology of Risk describes a social reality which radically 
doubts the previously used modes of attribution and compensation of side 
effects. It characterizes risk as a prominent category of social reflection, at a 
time of social evolution in which ecological risks cannot be extinguished or 
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diminished by any of the functional systems at the center, be they law, politics, 
the economy, or science. Luhmann remains ambiguous: On the one hand, he 
speaks about an internal logic of the subsystems, which complicates the treat-
ment and predicting of ecological crises. On the other hand, he states that sys-
tems possess a remarkable capability for learning (ibid., 111). In 1986, Luh-
mann warned the reader about protests and a potentially destructive build-up of 
problems. Later his argumentation was markedly calmer. He suggested tempo-
rary agreements between decision-makers and the affected (see Luhmann 
2008). In a world that thinks of its future in terms of probable and improbable, 
it may be advisable to “cultivate parallel and quite distinct communication 
channels that are able to function regardless of whether and to what extent 
participants can mutually reconstruct the universes of their observations” 
(Luhmann 1993, 231). 
4.  Ulrich Beck: Security and Risk in a (Global) Risk Society 
4.1  Sociological Diagnosis and Theoretical Perspective  
In advanced modernity the social production of wealth is systematically ac-
companied by the social production of risks. Accordingly, the problems and 
conflicts relating to distribution in a society of scarcity overlap with the prob-
lems and conflicts that arise from the production, definition and distribution of 
techno-scientifically produced risks (Beck 1992, 19). 
Beck’s theory, that we are transitioning from an industrial society to a risk 
society, and which he later expanded to a global risk society, has not only gen-
erated a broad response in sociology, but also in the public. “Risk society” 
quickly became a buzzword in the press. Published shortly after the Chernobyl 
incident, the volume had its finger firmly on the pulse of the time, owing to a 
pointed diagnosis of contemporary society a dramatic tone, an often polemic 
style, and its political and normative engagement. Despite all criticisms, Beck’s 
approach also remained a reference point for academic and scientific discus-
sions in the field, especially in the English-speaking reception. He applies the 
theoretical label of reflexive modernization to his work. This primarily means 
that risk and security strategies do not refer to the handling of nature, but the 
consequences of successful modernization. As a risk society, we face our unin-
tended side effects in three ways: in the form of produced risks, we face the 
side effects of unbridled production; with the demand for risk definitions, we 
are faced with the side effects of scientification processes; and with the con-
straint of having to decide over the distribution of risk, we face the political 
side effects of risk production. 
As a side effect of unbridled industrial production, Beck observes the devel-
opment of a specific type of risk. The sword of Damocles, a future catastrophe, 
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is the starting point of his diagnosis. When society speaks of risk, it does so in a 
very specific way. Where risk used to mean taking a chance, making a decision 
that may go wrong and cause damage, it now connotes “the threat of self-
destruction of all life on Earth” (ibid, 21). Unlike Luhmann’s interpretation, 
chances or opportunities are no longer part of the concept. Risk has to be corre-
lated to disaster: “Risk is not synonymous with catastrophe. Risk means the 
anticipation of the catastrophe” (Beck 2009, 9). This anticipation is not speci-
fied in space or time, or at a social level, and floats freely at an objective level. 
In Risk Society (1992) and Ecological politics in an age of risks (1995), 
Beck talks about the risk of large-scale technology and ecological problems, 
such as nuclear energy, genetic and reproduction technology, forest decline, 
loss of biodiversity, climate change, and AIDS . In the edition of World at risk 
published in 2009, he effortlessly expands the thematic field to global financial 
crises, Western “risk wars” (Beck 2009, 149 et seq.) and terrorist threats. The 
latter constitutes the catastrophic as an intentional side effect of growth (ibid., 
13 et seq.), in contrast to unintentional side effects, as in ecological and eco-
nomic threats. The latter constitutes the catastrophic as an intentional side 
effect of growth (ibid., 37 et seq.), in contrast to unintentional side effects, as in 
ecological and economic threats. It destroys basic forms of trust, and it makes 
the legitimation of scientific and technological innovations harder because 
society now has to consider that such technology may intentionally be used as a 
weapon. 
In a typological approach, Beck distinguishes between current threats and 
risks of the modern industrial age (see Beck 1992, 1995, 75-9; see also Bonß 
2011, 61 et seq.). In this context, as in many others, reflexivity means primarily 
that boundaries begin to blur. Potential damages brought about by industrial 
risks used to be limited in their local, temporal, and social scope. In a risk soci-
ety, they tend to be global, are irreversible and thus permanent, cannot be at-
tributed to an initiator, and they can potentially affect everyone. “[P]overty is 
hierarchic, smog is democratic” (Beck 1992, 36), is Beck’s oft-quoted dictum.7 
Beck’s essential criterion for the argument that we have crossed the threshold 
into a risk society is that new risks, in contrast to the classic industrial risks, are 
not insurable. They cannot be compensated with money. Regarding the debate 
about residual risks, Beck writes: “‘Residual risk society’ is a society without 
assurance, those insurance cover paradoxically diminishes in proportion to the 
scale of the hazard” (Beck 1995, 85).8 Beck explicitly contrasts his definition 
                                                             
7  Ultimately, Beck is less interested in clear typologies and concepts, and more interested in 
the description of problems; he uses Luhmann’s distinction between risk and threat to con-
ceptualise classic forms of risk distribution – waste export, dangerous products, controver-
sial research – into peripheral regions (Beck 2009, 140-2, 160-8), even though he doubts 
the validity of the distinction at another point (ibid, 12 et seq.).  
8  For a discussion of the criticisms of this theory, see Beck (2009, 129-39). 
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with two other positions. One is what he calls the “[n]aturalscientific objectiv-
ism about hazards” (ibid, 75). Similar to Luhmann, he uses a common socio-
logical criticism of technological and scientific risk calculations. He criticizes 
that objectivistic approaches “does not recognize the independent political 
dynamic of large-scale hazards” (ibid, 75). 
He also rejects a “cultural relativism of danger” as proposed by Douglas and 
Wildavsky (1982), which parallels pre-modern and contemporary perceptions 
of risk. This relativism misjudges the specificity of modern large-scale threats 
that are based on one’s own actions and constitute decision-based risks (Beck 
1995, 75 et seq.). In this way, Beck identifies risks as an objective problem of 
contemporary times. Modern risks, in contrast to its pre-modern forms, are 
being dealt with in other ways, both semantically and epistemically. 
4.2  Reflexivity of Science: Definitions of Risk, Non-Experience, 
Not-Knowing  
Contemporary risks are put as a problem of knowledge, or, more precisely, as a 
problem of definition. While new risks are facticities, as he points out, they are 
by no means obvious. The immediacy of social poverty, which determined the 
risks of industrial society, is different from the current “intangibility of threats 
from civilization” (Beck 1992, 52). Radioactive contamination, DDT residues 
in tea leaves, or toxic substances in the air cannot usually be perceived – they 
cannot be experienced, yet one needs to be aware of them. Since they are con-
veyed through knowledge, “they are particularly open to social definition und 
construction” (ibid., 23). From the perspective of the individual, “not having 
been able to know” becomes an irrevocable part of daily life. Beck calls it an 
“expropriation of the senses” (Beck 2009, 116). Similar to Luhmann, not-
knowing becomes a central category for Beck: “Living in world risk society 
means living with ineradicable non-knowing [Nichtwissen] or, to be more 
precise, with the simultaneity of threats and non-knowing” (ibid., 115). Unlike 
Luhmann, who derives the relationship between risk and (not-)knowing from 
cybernetic theory, Beck extracts it from (first order) empirical observations. 
Science, he reveals, is confronted with the side effects of his own success. 
Essentially, two movements can be identified. 
Firstly, science has a principle of doubt which is also applied to its own way 
of knowledge production. Unambiguousness in scientific statements is contest-
ed by the understanding of its own conditionality of decision, dependence on 
methods, and relation to context (Beck 1995, 118-22). With the acceleration of 
science production, the dominant experience is not the positivity of knowledge, 
but how quickly knowledge becomes obsolete. What is more, science is in-
creasingly becoming an area of conflict between expertise and opposing exper-
tise, not only in a competition of opinions but also in a competition of rationali-
ties, for instance, in the clash of scientific and sociological risk definitions 
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(Beck 1992, 57-71; 1995, 111-8). The uncertainty of knowledge becomes nor-
mal; it becomes a central problem (see Bonß 2011). Ultimately, Beck reaches a 
definition of the problem, similar to Luhmann:  
World risk society is a non-knowledge society in a very precise sense. In con-
trast to the premodern era, it cannot be overcome by more and better 
knowledge, more and better science; rather precisely the opposite holds: it is 
the product to more and better science (Beck 2009, 115). 
Secondly, the boundaries of science are becoming blurred. Research is going 
beyond the laboratory, as is the case with nuclear power plants whose safety can 
only be reviewed by building them, or genetic and reproduction technologies 
whose consequences are not foreseeable. The world is becoming a laboratory 
(Beck 1995, 122-4). This constitutes a dissolving of the boundaries of science, 
particularly where the central questions of technological and scientific risk pro-
duction are being negotiated. Science advances into more areas of life, it more 
often forms the basis for decisions and, at the same time, the politization of 
scientific knowledge is inevitable. Debates about threshold values are paradig-
matic. They very clearly demonstrate scientific, media, and political powers of 
creating definitions. Different disciplines fight over the power of interpretation, 
the significance of research results can no longer be determined within science, 
numerous interest groups are in dispute about it and, evidently, the decision is 
ultimately made by political regulations. In turn, politics can only refer to – 
contested – scientific expertise (Beck 1992, 64-9). Risks become an effect of 
the scientific, media, and political staging.  
4.3  Political Control: Organized Irresponsibility and Cosmopolit-
anism 
Similar to Luhmann, Beck states that the (global) risk society is characterized 
by the increasing constraint to make decisions, that these must increasingly be 
informed by (scientific) knowledge, despite this knowledge becoming more 
uncertain. He observes two tendencies as consequences of this disorientation: 
organized irresponsibility, on the one hand, and the rise of sub-political and 
cosmopolitan thinking, on the other. 
For Beck, organized irresponsibility in a narrow sense means that the logic 
of the legal assignment of guilt, which is based on the costs-by-cause principle, 
can no longer be applied in the context of contemporary risks (Beck 1995, 2 et 
seq.; 2009, 27-9). Who can be blamed, and singled out as causally responsible 
for climate change? When causal chains and cycles of damages are the result of 
highly differentiated work distribution, a “general complicity” (Beck 1992, 33) 
is created. An abstract system concept is dominant, which recognizes a sort of 
natural fate, but no responsibility in the classical sense. Organized irresponsi-
bility also means that the classic forms of precaution fail: Insurances cannot 
compensate, nor can emergency, rescue or supply systems provide adequate 
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aftercare in case of irreversible damages. Beck again comes to similar conclu-
sion as Luhmann: Neither law, provisional systems, nor traditional politics can 
sufficiently deal with the ecological threats of scientifically and technologically 
produced risks. There is a predominant “logic of institutionalized non-coping” 
(Beck 2009, 29). 
At the same time, two counter-movements are becoming apparent. Beck 
states that at the transition from an industrial society to a “second modernity,” 
all areas of life – including science, the economy, public life, politics, private 
life – are under new negotiation. The political becomes ubiquitous, there is a 
general pressure to make decisions, and decision-making problems allude to 
questions of power (see Beck 1997). This also means that political power is no 
longer only being fought over in traditional political arenas, and this also ap-
plies to political debates about risk. Beck observes the emergence of a sub-
political culture, in which citizens’ initiatives and social movements conquer a 
broader basis for public negotiations and new forms of participation, to open up 
the search for alternative paths of modernization (Beck 1992, 183-236). With 
that, a boundless and uncontrolled risk production could be managed with the 
help of more complex structures that include new forms of control (see Beck, 
Bonß and Lau 2001, 42-7). This sub-political element is complemented by a 
turn toward cosmopolitanism. Beck points out that the global risk society con-
tains a “cosmopolitan element” – you may say that society is compelled to find 
ways for cosmopolitan enlightenment, communication, and action (Beck 2009, 
47-66). To handle the problems of a “global community of threat,” a cosmopol-
itan form of politics, supplied by sub-political culture – meaning civil society – 
and by governments, could emerge from a dialectic movement and it could 
“realize a resilient diversity and a postnational order” (ibid., 8, 66). 
5.  Conclusion – Diagnosis of the Present: Security and 
Risk 
The time after 9/11 was characterized by a surge in security topics. Widely 
distributed policies and political programs, such as the homeland security con-
cept, were paradigmatic, and the surge was reflected in self-descriptions of, for 
example, a “security society.” This only becomes fully understandable in its 
basic structures when viewed in the context of specifically modern forms of 
defining and producing security and risk. Limited to the German debate, we 
consulted three sociological approaches – Kaufmann, Luhmann and Beck – 
who have developed theoretical reflections on security and risk. 
All three authors very specifically relate the pursuit of security and the 
treatment of risks to modern – meaning functionally differentiated, as opposed 
to stratified – societies. Kaufmann postulates that a general need for security, 
which defines security as a guiding principle and as a value concept, could only 
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develop in modernity. To him, security is correlated with the unique freedom of 
modernity, and to the release from classic institutional attachments. Security, as 
a term and as a need, no longer refers to primordial adversities, but to insecuri-
ties, which arise from systemically assured basic capacities. Luhmann and 
Beck also do not understand security and risk as something tied to primordial 
needs. For Luhmann, risk is connected to the problem of having to make deci-
sions in the face of a generally open future. The prominence of risk in social 
communication, which includes the thought that damages can be caused with a 
decision, is increased by the number of options and by the pressure to make a 
decision. The question of what is probable and what is improbable, who acts 
riskily and who may be endangered, becomes explosive. The future is increas-
ingly negotiated with these questions. Beck begins his reflections at the point 
where the problem of decision-making combines with the knowledge of the 
catastrophic potential of decisions. Risk serves to confront modernity with its 
own problems: through the specific forms of new risks, through the way sci-
ence becomes more reflective, and the shortcomings of previous democracies. 
Historiographically interpreted, these sociological definitions may initially 
be unsatisfactory. However, we can say that all three theories work with a 
concept that rejects the idea of a universal pursuit of security. Security and risk, 
defined in their current horizon of meaning, only appear after the transition to a 
functionally differentiated society. As such, the problem in which security and 
risk are rooted, is only possible in modern societies. It is becoming viral in 
many social areas of life, and in many forms. Luhmann, for example, traces the 
emergence of the risk issue to Italian seafaring in the Renaissance, where the 
modern insurance principle was developed. Sociology is far from providing 
even the basis of a history of these concepts and problems. Instead it is inter-
ested in when the security and risk issue became an urgent and general social 
topic which lies perpendicular to social subsystems. “Urgent,” “perpendicular,” 
and “general” can of course not be defined precisely. That is why the genesis 
and the diagnoses may be enriched by many aspects in a historiographical way 
of looking at these issues. 
For Kaufmann, security becomes relevant as soon as the concept of “social 
security” reaches a viral nature, and insecurity appears as a system description 
in many other fields. The starting point of Luhmann’s and Beck’s reflections is 
the discussion of ecological and large-scale technological risks. For Luhmann, 
the risk formula is only one of many relevant ways to observe modern society. 
For Beck, risk as an anticipation of disaster, is the central turning point in the 
development of modernity. Beck’s diagnosis may be a better fit for the general 
feeling of the current day and age, which manifests in the ubiquity of the secu-
rity topic. 
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